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First of all I should like to thank the President
and members of this Assembly and the Universidade
Lusófona for the honour of this invitation to speak
to you on the topic of ‘The Concept of Europe’1.
What I shall try to do today is to give you a few
brief indications concerning some of the different
and indeed diverse concepts of Europe which have
risen (and sometimes fallen) in the course of
European history; to relate these to contemporary
European problems, with a few words on the United
States; and finally to focus on one particular notion,
that of European governance, which now plays a
significant role in the orientation of European Union
policy. These are themes of rather different kinds,
ranging from philosophical history to considerations
on present-day politics. I hope that I can convince
you that they nevertheless have enough to do with
each other to be worthy of joint discussion in a single
talk.
Do we know what Europe is? Each of us
probably has his own picture, which also guides us
in practical activity. But we are in something of a
fog when it comes to orienting ourselves in what is,
after all, a particularly complex field. There are, we
might even say, innumerable conceptions of Europe
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– I shall talk about some of them. And they differ
greatly from one another.
Why, you might ask, do these differences matter?
It is after all a common situation in life that guiding
ideas are often ambiguous and multi-interpretable.
Well, it matters, in this case, because the political
direction to be taken by Europe depends to a
considerable extent on what we are trying to
achieve, on the direction which we want to take.
Is Europe for example to be understood as an
Europe des patries; a kind of minimalist conception
of Europe as a Union of perfectly sovereign nation-
states which cooperate in the establishment of a
common market and in the elaboration of the
regulatory mechanisms needed to support that
market? Or is Europe rather an Europe des
peuples, where the peoples are defined in something
like ethnic terms? Or should we rather understand
it as an Europe des régions?2 And there is a further
question – in all these cases we can ask: which
nation-states, or which peoples, or which regions?
For many of us, we must now admit, Europe
and the European Union are realities whose
contours are however far from clear.
An American author, Melissa Rossi, remarked
not long ago that ‘Europeans are absolutely confused
about the European Union’.3 A recent Financial
Times editorial noted that not just individual citizens
but nation-States too are confused.4 Europeans –
an ex-German Ambassador wrote – are ‘confused
about the roles and representativity of the many
European institutions’.5 A German Member of the
European Parliament noted that it is indeed ‘easy
to be confused about Europe’s institutions’.6 And at
a media seminar in a would-be accession land, in
an evaluation of coverage of European news, the
difficulty was summed up in a few words: ‘The
European integration process [is] totally unintelligible
to normal people.’7 This, if it is more or less true, is
a serious state of affairs: people, in many cases,
don’t know what Europe is; and they don’t know
what it is for.
What then is Europe, and how did it come to be
what it is? Bismarck said: ‘Whoever speaks of
Europe is always wrong.’ He meant that Europe
has no status as a political entity. It looks as if he
was wrong. But what precise status does it have?
Our confusion about the European Union is fed
in part by a lack of clarity about the concept of
Europe itself. How and when did this concept
emerge? Of course there is not one single such
concept or idea. And there is no one certain and
satisfying answer to the question. But let me give
you a few historical references. Don’t worry – I
shall soon move on to questions of a more
contemporary significance.
The Austrian philosopher Edmund Husserl
identified the origins of Europe with ancient Greek
civilization. In the mid-1930s, in lectures on ‘The
crisis of European humanity’, he talks about the
‘spiritual essence of Europe’ as ‘the philosophical
idea ... immanent to its whole history’. The spirit of
Europe is literally the spirit of philosophy; that is to
say, it is universalistic, and in that respect resembles
the scientific spirit rather than the arts; but like the
arts and unlike science it is not utilitarian, that is,
not oriented to any practical end: its concern with
truth is disinterested. Some present-day thinkers
retain, as we shall see, such a spiritual notion of
Europe.
But the concept of Europe has other roots. The
example of the Roman Empire, and especially of
Roman law, is often cited. You, the Portuguese, are
in part, at least culturally, a Roman people. You
speak and write a dialect of Latin which allows even
me, a visitor from the north, partially to decipher
your newspapers. But equally important is the
Roman legal tradition, relayed via Justinian’s corpus
iuris, and taken up again and taught at the first
European universities, from the 11th century
onwards.
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To this reference we should add not just a
mention of Church law, but of the administrative
apparatus of the Church, probably the first modern
administrative system in western history, as Harold
Berman points out in his brilliant study on Law and
Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal
Tradition. Europe is still identified by some thinkers
of our time with the Christian or sometimes Catholic
cultural tradition: this was a powerful current in
European thinking before the Second World War,8
and is still reflected for instance in the work of the
historian Rémi Brague,9 or of Vaclav Havel, or even
of Romano Prodi. Mr Prodi’s central contention in
this connexion, as one commentator summarizes it,
is ‘that Europe at its millennium crossroads must
choose the road to a ‘major moral revolution’ if it is
to make genuine progress beyond the single
currency’ and such technical advances. This, he
argues, can be properly accomplished ‘only by
consciously applying the doctrines of Christianity.’10
There is however a rather different root notion
of the complex idea of Europe, an 18th century
conception. If you would like to access the original
texts in this matter, look for instance at Gibbon’s
celebrated Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,
in particular his section on ‘General Observations
on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West’. For
Gibbon, Europe – he is talking about his own age –
is ‘one great republic, whose various inhabitants
have attained almost the same level of politeness
and cultivation’. This is a large part of Europe’s
secret: Europe is civilization; its task is thus to
‘make itself secure from any future irruption of
Barbarians’. The other side of the 18th century
conception of Europe, also noted by Gibbon, is the
emphasis on the balance of political power
between the European nations. So important is this
idea of the balance of power that it forms the basis
of a long and famous line of writings on what was
called ‘perpetual peace’, from Grotius, William
Penn, Leibniz and Rousseau to Kant and Jeremy
Bentham.
This is in fact a topic of potentially immense
importance – to us today. Let me therefore say a
few more words about it. You probably know the
writings of the American historian Robert Kagan
on the present-day world situation. ‘It is time to stop
pretending’, writes Kagan in Power and Weakness
(in Policy Review, 2002), ‘that Europeans and
Americans share a common view of the world, or
even that they occupy the same world. On the all-
important question of power – the efficacy of power,
the morality of power, the desirability of power –
American and Europeans perspectives are
diverging.... Europe is ... moving beyond power into
a self-contained world of laws and rules and
transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is
entering a post-historical paradise of peace and
relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s
‘Perpetual Peace’.’ Kagan’s argument is thus
roughly that, whereas the US Government is living
and operating in the real, ‘Hobbesian’ world of
anarchy and power, the Europeans are living in an
imaginary ethical universe. His point is that the
Europeans can only afford to take this ‘ethical’ line
because they live, parasitically, under the American
military umbrella.
But the matter is more complicated than that. If
it really is true that Europe has adopted a Kantian,
that is to say ‘moral’ international policy, then only
in combination with an abandonment of the typically
European balance-of-power stance. Like the United
States, Europe would in that case also have adopted
an essentially monopolar model of international
relations, the difference being that the Americans
see this monopolarity as being essentially power-
based, the Europeans preferring an ethically-
structured but still essentially monopolar vision.
But what a monopolar system cannot entirely
protect itself against is the violence of those who
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choose to play a different game than the classic
struggle among nation-states: the terrorists. Indeed,
in a post-balance-of-power world, the violence that
is inherent to history comes, as one Egyptian
commentator has argued,11 to be identified as
essentially terrorist violence – and therefore as
something post-historic, the struggle against this
violence being a matter of a combination of moral
condemnation and of advanced techniques of
repression.
However that may be, it is, I hope, beginning to
become clear that reflection on the various sources
of the idea of Europe need not be irrelevant to
present-day concerns.
Let me say a few final words about just one
more of these sources. It is to be found in naked
form in the late writings of Friedrich Nietzsche.
Nietzsche too is interested in power. But he is no
friend of the nation-State. The significant point here
is that the new Europe – the Europe of the nation-
States – has, on Nietzsche’s view, inherited the
Christian tradition and thus fallen prey to the
democratic virus. This ‘collective degeneration of
man’, his ‘animalization’, his transformation into a
‘pygmy of equal rights’, and so on, is a function of
the rise of the institutions of the nation-States, which
runs parallel with the rise of democracy.
One discovers, reading through the section on
‘Peoples and Fatherlands’ in Beyond Good and
Evil, that Nietzsche’s dislike of the nation-State –
which of course is directed, in the first place, against
Germany, but is not limited to this case – is tempered
by his belief that a process is beginning in which
some of the citizens of these nation-States are, as
he puts it, ‘becoming Europeans’; that is to say, there
is a ‘slow emergence of an essentially supra-national
... type of man’.
A paradox is that Nietzsche predicts that this
process of Europeanization will first of all lead to a
further democratization of political life on the
European continent. But this democratic trend must
undermine itself: the future Europeans will,
Nietzsche claims, probably be ‘multifarious,
garrulous, weak-willed and highly employable
workers who need a master, a commander, as they
need their daily bread’; so this process will lead to
the ‘production of a type [of human being] prepared
for slavery’. Yet the same process will, in individual
and exceptional cases, provoke the emergence of
strong men, ‘stronger ... than has perhaps ever
happened before’. Everything depends on the form
that any movement towards a supra-national Europe
might take. In this connection, there are, leaving
aside the German case, at least two possibilities: on
the one hand, the emergence and domination of a
‘European noblesse – of feeling, of taste, of custom,
in short noblesse in every exalted sense of the word
– [which] is the work and invention of France’; on
the other hand the victory of ‘European vulgarity,
the plebeianism of modern ideas’, which is the work
of England.
But, one way or another, the unification of
Europe must, on Nietzsche’s view, take place. In
his own time, he says, this is not yet understood:
‘Thanks to the morbid estrangement which the
lunacy of nationality has produced and continues
to produce between the peoples of Europe, thanks
likewise to the shortsighted and hasty-handed
politicians who are, with its aid, on top today and
have not the slightest notion to what extent the
politics of disintegration they pursue must necessarily
be only an interlude - thanks to all this ... the most
unambiguous signs are now being overlooked, or
arbitrarily and lyingly misinterpreted, which declare
that Europe wants to become one’.
Remember the circumstances under which
Nietzsche was writing these words. Beyond Good
and Evil was published in 1886 – that is to say, in a
period in which it was generally considered in
political circles that Europe had ‘ceased to exist’.
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Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, in his L’Idée d’Europe
dans l’histoire (1965) quotes for instance the
French Ambassador, writing in 1875, to the effect
that ‘one of the principal causes of the dangers now
confronting us is the absence of what used to be
called Europe’. A few years later, Jules Ferry (the
French colonialist statesman) was writing that
‘Europe has ceased to exist, and that is our
weakness’.
The key date in this connection is 1870-71, the
date of the victory of Prussia in its war against
France, following its victory against Austria-
Hungary, and thus the date of the consolidation of
Prussian domination in much of continental Europe.
It is also the date of the establishment of the German
Empire.
The key figure in the same connection was of
course Bismarck, who I already quoted. Bismarck,
though not a German nationalist, did believe in a
plurality of historically-defined European nation-
states. But the only healthy basis for the politics of
a great State, said Bismarck, is egoism. There is no
valid European law. It is not true that pacta sunt
servanda. This means that there can be no
‘Congress of European States’, of the kind proposed
by Kant. Bismarck was quite explicit on the matter:
Europe is nothing but ‘a geographical idea’.
In contrast, Nietzsche insists that the union of
Europe must come. What interests Nietzsche is not
the nation-state or German Empire but a united
Europe. The task of the ‘deepest and comprehen-
sive spirits of our age’ is to prepare this ‘European
synthesis’: and for all kinds of reasons, including an
economic reason. The nation-States, he argues, are
no longer viable as autonomous units – there ought
in particular to be a single currency and a single
European State. Only the British can hold up this
process, he adds, but not for long.
This new Europe can however only be
successfully constructed on condition that we
liberate it from the menace of democracy and other
forms of the marasmus femininus. The new, united
Europe will thus serve as an antidote to the
democratic nation-State. Nietzsche, in summary,
is a pro-European because he is an anti-democrat.
I have spoken at some length about Nietzsche
because his idea of Europe, though it has many
individual idiosyncrasies, is typical of one particular
characteristic of the long tradition of pan-European
thought – namely, its relative hostility of this tradition
to democracy. Up to the Second World War, indeed,
democracy was (with some exceptions) a movement
and reality closely associated with the nation-state
form, whereas the pan-Europeans tended to take
an anti-democratic position. Democracy is a mass
movement; it tends, as Nietzsche argued, to
enthusiasm and even to fanaticism. The cause of
Europe, in contrast, just because of the association
of Europe with philosophy, reason, science and the
like, was widely thought to require taking a distance
from mass rule. Think of Ortega y Gasset’s Revolt
of the Masses, or of Julien Benda’s Discours à la
nation Européenne of 1933: Benda is pro-European
because he believes that Europe is the realization
of the principle of Reason. He is an ‘aristocrat of
Reason’, rather than a democrat, because he holds
that the masses can never attain to this principle of
Reason. The masses are nationalist or religious
fanatics; only the intellectual elite can create and
lead a future united Europe. Europe will therefore
not be a kind of super-nation, appealing to a sort of
European patriotism, as the nation-States appealed
and still appeal to a national patriotism. Europe will
be a product of pure Reason. That is why it must
be the work of an elite. And so on.
It is worth emphasizing this traditional link
between Europeanism and a hostility to democracy
because of one of its consequences: namely that,
with the establishment after the Second World War
of the European Communities – now the European
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Union – there was no unequivocal political ideology
of ‘European democracy’ to build on. This had to
be reconstructed – or rather, the ideas of individual
freedoms and rights, of democracy, of the rule of
law and so on explicitly embraced by the European
Communities had to be imported from the nation-
states. But although guaranteed at a higher,
European level, they appeared at that level to be
less than entirely concrete in their content – for their
application remained in essence a matter for each
member-state and for its political and legal system.
In a moment I shall make a suggestion as to
how the European Union is now coming to terms
with what I would call, not a democratic deficit, but
a democratic formalism. One response, I will
suggest, makes central use of the notion of European
governance.
* * *
But let me first entertain you with a few
examples of present-day reflections on the idea of
Europe. I want, so to speak, in the friendliest manner
to provoke you.
I begin with Eduardo Lourenço. Prof. Lourenço
argues in his L’Europe introuvable that the first
Iraqi war, the Gulf War, was the ‘greatest ever
defeat of Europe—of the whole of Europe, from
Lisbon to Moscow—since the fall of Constantinople.
We Europeans’, he adds, ‘are now travelling in the
baggage train of Philip of Macedonia.... Europe’s
defeat in the Gulf War was not a military defeat ...
but a cultural defeat. We fought this war in our heads
as if we were Americans.... [Our culture has
become] a luxurious dustbin of history, devoted to
the mixed delights of violence, entertainment and
submission’.
Let me, as the Americans say, now ‘pile it on’.
Charles Krauthammer of the Washington Post has
written: ‘America won the Cold War, pocketed
Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic as
door prizes, then proceeded to pulverize Serbia and
Afghanistan and, en passant, highlight Europe’s
irrelevance with a display of vast military
superiority. We dominate every field of human
endeavour from fashion to film to finance. We rule
the world culturally, economically, diplomatically and
militarily as no one has since the Roman Empire.’
Strangely, or not so strangely, the events and
developments of the last decade or so are
interpreted in an almost opposite sense by different
commentators. The Russian dissident Alexander
Zinoviev, for instance, claims in various recent pieces
that the civilization of western Europe is facing
destruction on account of the shift of power within
the world system to the United States. West-
European civilization, Zinoviev insists, is the greatest
of all historical civilizations. It reached its highest
point with the emergence of the nation states. Yet
already at the beginning of the 20th century the
suspicion arose that this civilization was exhausted
and its days numbered. Decades later, the end of
the Cold War and the dismantling of the Soviet
system have resulted in the emergence of a new
supranational structure essentially destructive of the
old European civilizations – ‘old Europe’, as Mr
Rumsfeld might say – ushering in a post-democratic
era.
In complete contrast, Vaclav Havel suggests that
it is precisely today’s Europe and indeed the
European Union itself which can claim to be founded
on ‘values with roots in antiquity and in Christianity
which, over 2000 years, evolved into what we
recognize today as the foundations of modem
democracy, the rule of law and civil society. This
set of values has its own clear moral foundation
and its obvious metaphysical roots’, Havel adds.12
We know where he looks for inspiration on the
matter of the deepest roots of European identity: ‘It
is scarcely possible’, he writes, ‘to find a culture
that does not derive from the conviction that a higher,
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mysterious order of the world exists beyond our
reach, a higher intention that is the source of all
things, a higher memory recording everything, a
higher authority to which we are all accountable in
one way or another. That order has had a thousand
faces; human history has known a vast array of
gods and deities, religious and spiritual beliefs, rituals
and liturgies. Nevertheless, from time immemorial,
the key to the existence of the human race, of nature,
and of the universe, as well as the key to what is
required of human responsibility, has always been
found in what transcends humanity, in what stands
above it. Humanity must respect this if the world is
to survive.... All of this clearly suggests where we
should look for what unites us: in an awareness of
the transcendental.’
Havel thus counters the tendency to claim that
Europe has become nothing other than a supplier of
material welfare, an instrument of advanced
capitalism. Some other Christian thinkers would
agree – but so, in his way, would for example the
French political philosopher Etienne Balibar. He
wants to persuade us that Europe and its idea owe
much to the communist tradition. ‘We have to ask’,
he remarks, ‘what the place is of communism’ – as
idea, movement and political system – in the history
of Europe, ‘or what is the relation between the
history of communism and the history of Europe?’
Communism, he argues, ‘has functioned ... as the
universalist, critical alternative to the great étatiste
theories of society, expressing the ‘insurrectional’
point of view of the oppressed classes’. In this
connexion, the very idea of Europe is directly
dependent on the place occupied by communism
(or [various] communisms) in the history of political
thought.... For in exporting Communism through the
whole world (after having exported the Bible),
Europe took a step outside of itself, such that it could
never again exist as a closed unity.... Thus our whole
conception of European civilization is affected by
the ‘end of communism’ (or by the latest end of
communism).’13
Finally, Edgar Morin draws attention to the fact
that, if democracy has indeed become the common
political characteristic of Europe, this is not an
unproblematic state of affairs for European
civilization. For ‘beyond a certain level, liberty
destroys equality and corrupts fraternity; beyond a
certain level, equality destroys liberty without
necessarily creating fraternity. So political
democracy contains in itself ethical ‘double binds’.’
For instance, ‘the fundamental truth of democracy
is not to possess any truth’; ‘the key of the
democratic idea lies in its rules’ – so not in any
substantive values, though these were once the
pride of European cultural history.14
* * *
My last topic is linked to Morin’s point. I
mentioned that I should like to focus on the notion
of European governance, which has come to play a
significant role in the political arrangements of the
European Union. This notion may be linked to the
above-mentioned question of the widespread lack
of understanding of – or confusion about – Europe
and the European Union. An obvious difficulty is
that Europe is, in a certain sense, a ‘monster’15 –
that is, it has a very odd shape which does not fit
pre-existing categories of the classification of
political bodies. So we hardly know how to deal
with it, how to judge it or even where to begin in
trying to understand it.
My argument is that the present and probable
future shape of the European Union is in part a
function of a now fashionable view of State
administration and of its functions, known as
‘contractual governance’.
As the name suggests, this approach finds its
basis in the application of a certain conception of
(social) contract.
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Let me situate the question at issue by citing a
European University Institute working paper by
Christian Joerges on ‘The Law in the Process of
Constitutionalizing Europe’.16
Joerges’ analysis of the relevance of the
European Constitution places it in the context of
the ‘strategies of juridification of the integration
project’. The reasons for this juridification have to
do in part with the configuration of European
institutions, in particular with the role of the
European Court of Justice, in whose work – the
author notes – methodology and theory as to the
legitimacy of Europe’s constitutional charter are
lacking. But, more generally, whenever the
integration project has been renewed, it was, he adds,
in any case in a direction that ‘tended to confirm a
supranational, non-state legal constitution’.
Community law has, he argues, been employed
by the EU to achieve regulatory ends, especially in
respect to the internal market programme. But
‘because the EU itself ... lacks the administrative
powers necessary to implement legally-binding rules
in Member States, it has to try to compensate for
these shortcomings’. And these attempts give yet
more impetus to juridification.
In this way Europe has become something like
what has been called a ‘regulatory State’17 or a
regulatory super-State – if not, perhaps, a post-
regulatory super-State18 – in all of which cases the
distinction between public and private spheres is
blurred and the function of government tends ever
more often to be substituted by that of (European)
governance.
The position of the State is, as we know, now
under pressure from rival, non-State institutions,
especially those operating on a global scale – a
striking example being the World Trade
Organization, previously GATT, whose rules are now
said to be of application to more than 90% of
international trade relations. Such institutions are
even claimed to be in process of assuming the role
of (global) government. As in the case of the
European Union, but against a different historical
and political background, it is said to be a matter of
transfers of power and (as I mentioned) of where
sovereignty is coming to lie. I prefer to say that there
is a crisis of sovereignty, external and also internal.
This crisis of sovereignty is general: that is to
say, in so far as it affects the nation-state, it affects
in principle any other state-like body or super-state.
Thus it would normally affect the European Union
too. This is a potential problem. But – this is my
suggestion – the European Union has succeeded to
some extent in evading the impact of this difficulty
by packaging itself not so much as a new
governmental structure but rather as a governance
system.
We might say that it has now been established –
though not without resistance from various quarters
– as a kind of regulatory super-administration, with
a governance form. The term ‘governance’ is indeed
used in official documents, for instance in the
European Commission’s White Paper on European
Governance of October 2000. This White Paper is
concerned, among other things, with working out
ways to make application of ‘contracts of agreed
objectives between the Union, represented by the
Commission, and the authorities with a regulatory
or management capability’ (note the terminology).19
Joerges argues, more generally, that it is not
surprising that the real-life practices of European
government can best be grasped with the concept
of ‘governance’. He even quotes Joseph Weiler’s
words about the ‘underworld’ of the European
governance system.20 Another commentator,
Lawrence Lessig, speaks in the same connexion of
various alternative modes of regulation: combining
law with markets; combining law with norms, as in
so-called self-regulation; and the ‘hybrid of norms
and law’ called contractual government.21 Indeed,
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the policy vocabulary is nowadays rich with new
conceptual combinations.
We may formulate this point in another way. Let
us for a moment, one last time, take a step back in
history – to Hegel. Hegel (writing in 1821) insists
that the State cannot be a contractually-based
institution. ‘It is … far from the truth’, he notes, ‘to
ground the nature of the State on the contractual
relation.’ Indeed, ‘the intrusion of this contractual
relation … into the relation between the individual
and the State has been productive of the greatest
confusion in both constitutional law and public
life.’22 This confusion is now greater than ever and
perhaps deliberately produced.
In this regard I was interested to read a few
years ago a piece by the French political scientist
Gérard Duprat, in which he argues that, precisely
from a Hegelian point of view, the European
Community is not a State-like construction, even if
it plays, in part, a governing role. Its ‘powers’ ought
not even, he suggests, to be called ‘political’. It
functions for the most part outside of any system of
representation – and to that extent its so-called
‘democratic deficit’ is not a fault but lies in the logic
of its principles of operation.23 It does however
provide a system of justice and it polices that
system; it is oriented to the satisfaction of needs. In
short: it is a civil society, in Hegel’s sense. More
accurately, it is a management system for civil
society. In short, it is contractual governance.
The reluctance of the European Union to endow
itself with orthodox State-like powers is indeed, it
seems to me, an expression not just of political
discretion in the face of the sensitivities or resistance
of the member States but also of the influence of
the presently influential revisionary view of what
State-like powers ought to look like. Some of the
Union’s leading figures may indeed even believe
that its own assumption of a governance role will
render not only the old-fashioned nation-state
function redundant, but even the super-state function.
In any case, in this way the European Union
has also evaded a number of problems concerning
the relation of the Union to the principle of
democratic rule. For some years, as you know, there
has for instance been controversy on the matter of
the role and competence of the European parliament.
No satisfactory solution has been found to this
problem – and for good reason. For if the Union
lacks the essential characteristics of a sovereign
state or super-state (and of course it does and will
always do so, as long as its member-states maintain
their existence) then its parliament cannot function
as the legislator of any sovereign body. But to assign
the parliament only secondary or derivative rights
was and is to suggest that the existence of a
‘democratic deficit’, a notion which cries out for
remedy.
By transforming itself into a governance system,
the European Union claims a status which is much
vaguer, more flexible and thus more robust than if it
were to try to operate according to the traditional,
much more rigid principles of a properly
governmental body.24
But this ingenious solution creates new problems.
For ‘governance’ is nothing other than a new version
of the old dream of the substitution of administration
for politics. This is not so much an anti-democratic,
nor yet a democratic, as a post-democratic notion –
a notion moreover appropriate to an attempt to
abstract, in the work of the management of society,
from any attachment to substantive value. That is
to say: to the extent that the European Union defines
or redefines its role in governance terms, it
necessarily ends to shy away from fundamental
political struggle (where politics means more than
an iterated process of negotiation between the
member states, or between ‘social partners’ and
the like). Since however political conflict cannot be
extinguished by administrative means, this conflict
will tend to relocate again to national level – where
Grahame Lock
32 RES-PUBLICA
however, given the real transference of powers that
has taken place from the member states to the
European Union, it will be met with frustration.
This, it seems to me, is an example of a concept
of Europe – in this case the universalist concept
based on principles of democracy and individuals
rights etc. – meeting an idea of social and political
management – in this case of European governance
– and thereby generating some unexpected new
problems and effects.
With these comments I close, with thanks, my
lecture.25
Lisbon, Assembleia da República, 23. III. 2004.
Notas
1 Conferência proferida na Sala do Senado da Assembleia da
República, em 23 de Março de 2004, em sessão presidida por S.
Exa. O Presidente da Assembeia da República, Dr. João Bosco
Mota Amaral, secundado, na mesa, pelo Magnífico Reitor da
Universidade Lusófona, Prof. Doutor Fernando dos Santos
Neves, e pelo Prof. Doutor João Bettencourt da Câmara, que
apresentou o orador.
2 See for example Paul Treanor, ‘Visions of Europe’. Those of
you who are interested in beer may like to know that Mr
Freddie Heineken, who founded the great Dutch Heineken beer
empire, became interested towards the end of his life in such a
conception of Europe, and published a new map of Europe in
which the existing nation-states disappeared, to be replaced by
regional regroupings of peoples.
3 Foreign Policy Association interview with Melissa L. Rossi, at
http://www.fpa.org.
4 Financial Times, June 22, 2002.
5 Immo Stabreit, ex-German Ambassador to the USA and France,
at http://www.coeur.ws/meetings/meeting1c.htm.
6 Klaus Hänsch, idem.
7 The seminar took place in Armenia: see http://
www.humanr igh t s . coe . in t /media /a tcm/2000/Armenia /
synopsis1.doc.
8 See for instance Christopher Dawson’s The Making of Europe,
1932. Of course its origins are much older, as for example in
Novalis’ Christianity or Europe of 1799.
9 In his Europe, la voie romaine, 1992.
10 In Domenico Pacitti’s review of European commission
President Romano Prodi’s Un’idea dell’ Europa, 1999.
11 M. Sid-Ahmed in Al Ahram, August - September 2002.
12 ‘About European Identity’, speech made by to the European
Parliament in Strasbourg on March 8th, 1994.
13 Etienne Balibar, Nous, citoyens d’Europe, 2001.
14 Edgar Morin, Penser l’Europe, 1987.
15 See Grahame Lock, ‘Philosophies of Europe’, in Scienza &
politica, 14, 1996, quoting Hans Oversloot, ‘Europe as a
Monster’, 1994: Monsters ‘figure as monsters in and ‘because
of’ the ... specific way [the] cultural order has defined the
natural order’. Oversloot refers to the Copenhagen Declaration
on European Identity, which, in setting up purely universalist
principles – the principles of representative democracy, of the
rule of law, of social justice and of human rights, with no
geographical or cultural references – as constitutive of the
essence of Europe, makes Europe ‘boundless’ – and
‘boundlessness is a problem in political theory’.
16 ARENA Conference on Democracy and European Governance:
Theory and Practice in the Debate on the Future of Europe,
Oslo, March 4-5 2002; Badia Fiesolana: European University
Institute, 2002.
17 For example by Giandomenico Majone; see Majone (ed.),
Regulating Europe, London: Routledge, 1996.
18 On the post-regulatory State, see Colin Scott, ‘Regulation in
the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State’,
National Europe Centre Paper No. 100, Australian National
University, 2003.
19 The White Paper notes for example that ‘in recent years, the
word ‘governance’ has been cropping up in various contexts....
For the purpose of the Commission’s White Paper on European
Governance, ‘governance’ will be taken to encompass rules,
processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers
are exercised at European level, particularly as regards
accountability, clarity, transparency, coherence, efficiency and
effectiveness.’ It also ‘highlights the involvement of regional,
local and non-governmental actors in the policy-making
process.’
20 Weiler, interview in Die Zeit, no. 44, 22 October 1998; quoted
by Joerges.
21 Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, New York: Basic
Books, 1999; quoted in Scott, op. cit., 18.
22 Hegel, Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie des
Rechts), § 75
23 Duprat, ‘Europe et démocratie’, Philosophie Politique, Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, no. 1, 144, 1991.
24 Mr Prodi, in a speech of 2000, has argued that at world level
too ‘we need to devise some democratically accountable way
of handling globalization, a new kind of global governance to
manage the global economy’, and that ‘any such system must
involve three key elements: strong institutions based on shared
values; co-operation between increasingly integrated regions
of the world; and democratic accountability.
25 Some sections of this lecture are taken from my Oikoumenes
promachoi: Inaugural lecture at Leiden University, November
2003.
